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ESSAY 
COMMUTING TO MARS: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS 
ABRAHAM AND RABIN 
Ryan Calo* 
As Yogi Berra once said, it is difficult to make predictions, especially 
about the future. In Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer Responsibility 
for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, Professors Kenneth 
Abraham and Robert Rabin propose a detailed system for addressing 
injuries caused by driverless cars.1 The system strikes me as sensible and 
well thought out given how we use cars today. But if our relationship to 
vehicles continues to shift with the technology, then the solution on offer 
has the potential to unravel.  
The remarks that follow are less about the particular wisdom of 
manufacturer enterprise responsibility (MER) for driverless cars, and 
more about the limits of legal scholarship in grappling with unfolding 
technologic change. The contingency of technology and its social impacts 
caution against sweeping interventions. And the role of law and 
technology scholarship—as opposed to legal scholarship that touches 
upon technology—is arguably to recognize the unique challenges that 
arise at this intersection. 
 
* I am the Lane Powell and D. Wayne Gittinger Associate Professor of Law and the Faculty 
Co-Director of the Tech Policy Lab at the University of Washington. I would like to thank the 
editors of the Virginia Law Review for their excellent edits and suggestions as well as 
Professors Abraham and Rabin for their enlightening article. 
1 Kenneth S. Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer Respon-
sibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105 Va. L. Rev. 127 (2019).  
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I. 
Driverless cars are having a moment. It is not their first. In the 1990s, 
the Department of Transportation (DOT) became very invested in the 
prospect of automated vehicles for many of the same reasons that 
Professors Abraham and Rabin cite. The agency wrote lengthy reports on 
the technology and even funded an ambitious demonstration, which took 
place in California in 1997 to great acclaim.2 The event garnered 
unprecedented media attention and popularized a term, “Intelligent 
Transportation Systems,” that Professors Abraham and Rabin never use, 
and that you have probably never even heard.3 
Thirty years ago, the DOT assumed that the intelligence behind 
automated vehicles would arise from the infrastructure—street smarts, as 
it were. The cars of the future (i.e., of today) were to ride upon virtual 
rails embedded in highways and roads. Automated vehicles would avoid 
collision by monitoring one another, but primarily they would interact 
with an augmented transportation environment. 
This configuration did not come to pass. If it had, the legal structures 
Professors Abraham and Rabin propose—responsive as they are to the 
complex, sometimes inscrutable design decisions made by individual 
manufacturers—would be of limited utility. What occurred instead is that 
innovations in sensing technology and machine learning in the wake of 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Grand 
Challenge in Nevada shepherded in an era of driverless cars with good 
enough sensors and processors to navigate our streets without 
coordination or assistance.4  
Professors Abraham and Rabin aim their sensible intervention at the 
contemporary model of a driverless car and the “radically new world of 
auto accidents” it portends.5 On their view, which is widely shared by 
government and industry, we should expect more and more vehicles on 
the road that are capable of driving without human intervention. At some 
 
2 For a first-hand description, see Chuck Thorpe et al., The 1997 Automated Highway Free 
Agent Demonstration, 1998 IEEE 496–501. 
3 Berkeley California PATH, National Automated Highway Systems Consortium (2019), 
[https://perma.cc/PV68-GR49] (last visited Feb. 21, 2019) (“Demo ’97 generated an unprece-
dented level of media attention for Intelligent Transportation Systems, and we have made no 
attempt to capture the media aspects of that event here.”).  
4 See John Markoff, Machines of Loving Grace: The Quest for Common Ground Between 
Humans and Robots 23, 28–29, 36 (2015) (discussing advances in machines in the wake of 
the DARPA Grand Challenge). 
5 Abraham & Rabin, supra note 1, at 128–29.  
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point these vehicles will reach a critical mass—say, twenty-five percent 
of all registered vehicles6—at which time the recommendation is to pass 
sweeping national legislation that preempts state regulations and common 
law and establishes primary and exclusive liability for bodily injury in 
manufactures through a mandatory fund.7  
The authors assume that driverless cars will continue to operate 
roughly as they do in prototype. I see this as a solid assumption about the 
technology. From what I know of the state of driverless car technology, 
and particularly given the enormous investments by industry in sensors 
and machine learning, I would be surprised if the basic approach to 
automating vehicles were to shift again dramatically in the near term.  
I would be equally surprised if Americans retained anything like their 
present relationship to cars. 
It is tempting to understand driver automation as simply the end point 
of a continuum, a mental model that the five “levels” developed by the 
Society of Automotive Engineers reinforces.8 In actuality, the prospect of 
vehicles that do not require humans to drive them represents a 
qualitatively distinct affordance. Think of how different cities would look 
if parking downtown were unnecessary.9 Imagine the variations in vehicle 
design that the absence of steering wheels, pedals, or even windshields 
will support. Consider how a vehicle that could safely drop your child off 
at school would affect your commute or the shape of your school district.  
Indeed, traditional automotive engineers are not driving the present 
revolution. The leaders in the field of automated vehicles are technology 
companies. Driverless car pioneer Waymo is a spinoff of Google, which 
of course provides free digital services on an advertising model. Its 
nearest rival is Uber, a ride-sharing app that delivers transportation on 
demand. These companies are not interested in selling cars to 
individuals—they invest billions in automation because of the prospect of 
a limitless, exquisitely coordinated reservoir of robots capable of moving 
people around. 
 
6 Id. at 132.  
7 See id. at 148–49, 151–52.  
8 The authors describe and embrace the levels in the Introduction. Id. at 129–31.  
9 See Alan Ohnsman, The End Of Parking Lots As We Know Them: Designing For A 
Driverless Future, Forbes (May 18, 2018, 11:31 AM), [https://perma.cc/FSJ5-A34J]; Tech 
Policy Lab, Driverless Seattle: How Cities Can Prepare for Automated Vehicles (Mar. 1, 
2017), [https://perma.cc/M7GN-ZMUC]. 
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The prospect that widespread vehicle autonomy will dramatically alter 
the way humans get around has consequences, including for the proposal 
Professors Abraham and Rabin lay out in careful detail. As Professors 
Abraham and Rabin remark in passing, “private vehicle ownership may 
go the way of the horse-and-buggy.”10 Nevertheless, the liability system 
on offer repeatedly assumes that individuals will own and insure their own 
cars. For example, MER would exclude property damage on the apparent 
assumption that highly automated vehicle owners “still will likely 
purchase conventional auto insurance.”11  
When I conceive of even the immediate future of driverless vehicles, I 
do not think of a trip to the Volkswagen dealership to trade in my level 
three for a shiny new level four. I think of diversified fleets of automated 
vehicles owned by the companies that made them, or by large civic units 
such as cities, and deployed as a transportation resource in the near term. 
The relationship between an injured consumer and a private or public 
service, meanwhile, raises distinct considerations from traditional 
products liability. And while Uber and Volkswagen are each capable of 
spreading and avoiding costs, the incentive structure of an app-based 
technology company that both owns and operates its vehicles differs 
rather markedly from that of a car manufacturer that sells vehicles to 
people. 
I don’t have a crystal ball, any more than the authors. Imagine that 
neither I nor Professors Abraham and Rabin have correctly identified the 
future relationship of most Americans to vehicles or the timescale upon 
which change will occur. The very prospect that dramatically distinct 
modalities of transportation could arise from the ability of vehicles to 
drive themselves seems to caution against a preemptive, administratively 
intense solution that forbids state legislatures or courts from 
experimentation. Not even the apparent inspiration for MER—workers 
compensation—represents federal policy; workers comp is rather a 
creature of the state that can vary accordingly. Said another way, the 
authors’ proposal is certain; the future is not. 
II. 
The puzzle of how to deal with the contingency of technology and its 
social impacts is not limited to driverless cars, but endemic to law and 
 
10 Abraham & Rabin, supra note 1, at 130.  
11 Id. at 151–55.  
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technology scholarship. Personally I doubt Professors Abraham and 
Rabin—each renowned scholars of civil liability—identify themselves as 
working in “law and technology” as such. I imagine that for the authors, 
the ascendance of automated vehicles is just a fact about the world like 
any other, as the progress of technology often is.12 In my experience, 
however, reasoning about technological change sometimes requires 
special care. 
Take the concept of the “driverless car.” The underlying innovations 
that make driverless cars possible are, again, the introduction of new 
sensors (especially lidar) and improvements in techniques of machine 
learning that help computers recognize and react to patterns. These 
innovations introduce new human affordances, in the sense of additional 
capabilities to interact with our environment.13 But even assuming the end 
goal is safely moving people about, there is nothing inevitable about 
combining these constituent technologies in a traditional car. That 
decision flows from a constellation of choices dating back to the 
concerted effort of the automotive industry to promote individual car 
ownership, and the attendant—and, some allege, purposive—decimation 
of public transportation.14  
If we disaggregate the innovation of more accurate sensors and better 
machine learning from the construct of a driverless car, then far broader 
legal ramifications seem to follow. Consider Professors Abraham and 
Rabin’s key argument around why MER is necessary: neither federal 
agencies nor courts and juries possess the expertise to unpack the 
“esoteric, algorithm-based design differences” between highly automated 
vehicles.15 Surely this concern extends well beyond driverless cars to the 
 
12 Thus, for example, the Washington Supreme Court found no negligence on the part of the 
county for failing to build guardrails in 1928 capable of stopping a horse-drawn cart but not a 
car. Davison v. Snohomish Cty., 270 P.2d 422, 423 (Wash. 1928). That same court would later 
require a jury to determine whether a railway company was negligent forty years later for 
failing to protect against a similar accident on the theory that materials had become stronger 
and cheaper. Bartlett v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 447 P.2d 735, 737 (Wash. 1968). 
13 For a discussion of affordances, see Ryan Calo, Can Americans Resist Surveillance?, 83 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 23, 26–30 (2016). 
14 See, e.g., Robert C. Fellmeth, Politics of Land: Ralph Nader’s Study Group Report on 
Land Use in California 406, 415 (1973); see also Kate Crawford & Ryan Calo, Comment, 
There Is a Blind Spot in AI Research, 538 Nature 311, 311–313 (2016) (discussing how the 
trolley problem obscures the ways that investment in autonomous driving perpetuates 
prioritization of private cars over public transport).   
15 Abraham & Rabin, supra note 1, at 142–44. The Toyota sudden acceleration scandal of 
2011 provides an excellent example. Congress instructed the DOT to determine whether the 
reported propensity of Toyotas suddenly to accelerate was the product of a glitch in the 
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very wide array of robotics and cyber-physical systems being marketed 
and developed today.16 The reader would be forgiven for wondering what 
intellectual foundation there could be to arguing for an elaborate and 
expensive MER regime for vehicles but nothing else. 
My own view—which I am developing in connection to a larger project 
on law and technology—is that any legal scholarship that interacts with 
physical and digital artifacts would do well to state and defend a series of 
assumptions. Legal scholarship in general tends not to dwell on questions 
of methodology. I understand that Professors Abraham and Rabin expect 
MER to be evaluated on the basis of efficiency and cost-benefit analysis 
because I teach torts and I recognize the language of “optimal,” “adverse 
selection,” and “transaction costs.” But law and technology scholarship 
in particular would benefit from reflecting on a series of choices that are 
today largely implicit. 
One set of choices involves the methods and goals of the author. Much 
law and technology literature follows Professor Rabin’s former colleague 
Lawrence Lessig in understanding new technology as revealing “[l]atent 
ambiguities,” or gaps in the law that jurists must now resolve.17 
Scholarship in this mold is at once progressive, in that it takes 
technological progress as inevitable, and conservative, in that it 
understands the role of law as restoring the status quo ex ante in light of 
a disruption. There are alternatives to this approach, ranging from purely 
descriptive research that helps provide ground truth, to normative projects 
that understand new technology as an invitation to rethink what constitute 
realistic societal goals.  
The response you are reading concerns another choice: What is the 
scope of the technology under examination? Relatedly, what assumptions 
are the authors making around the trajectory of the technology or its social 
impact?  
As a longtime science fiction fan, I remember coming across the early 
days of the genre depicting marvelous progress in technology even as 
social norms somehow remained constant—1950s science fiction classics 
 
software. The DOT lacked the requisite expertise to answer this question and wound up having 
to ask NASA to take a break from placing robots on Mars to look at a Toyota for them. It took 
NASA four months, but they eventually cleared Toyota’s software. See Ryan Calo, The Case 
for a Federal Robotics Commission, Brookings Inst. (Sept. 15, 2014), [https://perma.cc/4LS2-
T7HM].  
16 These include drones, delivery carts, surgical robots, and personal and service robots. 
17 Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 22 (1999).  
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that invite the viewer to picture a world in which businessmen routinely 
commute to Mars on aircraft piloted by white men and serviced by 
stewardesses in short skirts. The reality is far more complex. 
Technological change occurs against a backdrop of social, cultural, and 
economic forces that in turn shape the trajectory of the technology itself.  
A wide variety of factors suggest that we may be on the cusp of a sea 
change in transportation. The very distinctions between manufacturer, 
owner, and consumers seem likely to collapse. The trouble with 
technology—and hence law and technology scholarship—is that truly 
novel affordances tend to invite reexamination of how we live. Legal 
scholarship must acknowledge this prospect or risk being its casualty.  
 
